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Abstract 
China is not merely growing at more than double the rate of the European countries 
during the Industrial Revolution, it is also urbanising at double the speed. Using a 
unique dataset of rural-to-urban migrants in 15 major Chinese cities, we give 
preliminary answers to some of the most pressing policy questions: how many 
migrants are there and what are their attributes? Are they dissatisfied or are their 
children  doing worse than the children  of others? Are they discriminated against in 
the labour market and, if so, what are the mechanisms via which this discrimination 
works and where are the market forces to undo the discrimination?  
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Introduction 
 
China is transforming from an agricultural society which witnessed almost no growth 
in the 1950-1978 period, to a modern society that is dominated by industry and 
services. At the end of the 1990s the major cities started to run out of capable cheap 
labourers and started to import more and more rural migrants. In 2005, the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) estimated there to be 130 million workers in the 
city who originate from the countryside, out of a potential rural workforce close to 
600 million. One of the groups of scholars examining the socio-economic aspects of 
this human population movement is organised around the ‘Rumici project’ and this 
paper brings together the preliminary answers that this research group has unearthed 
concerning migrants in China. 
The Rumici project (Rural Migration In China and Indonesia) mainly gathers data on 
actual migrants and is the first project of its kind in China to attempt to track a 
representative sample of migrants over time. The first wave of data, tracking 5,000 
migrants and 15,000 non-migrants in the city and in the countryside, became available 
in 2008 with the second wave coming out in November 2009. The data includes 
information about the wages, health, family circumstances, migration history, 
education history, wealth, and key opinions of migrants. 
We pose the following questions in this paper, all posed with an eye on the 
importance of internal migration in China for ‘the West’: 
1. General economic background: how fast has China been growing, when 
can it be expected to overtake the West, and how dominant will China 
become in terms of the size of the economy? 
2. General migration background: what has been the pattern of migration so 
far and how does this compare to the urbanisation seen during the 
Industrial Revolution in the West? 
3. Who are the migrants, what kind of role do they play in the economy, and 
what is happening to their families? 
4. Are the rural migrants being discriminated against, how does this 
discrimination work, does the discrimination make the migrants 
disgruntled and is the discrimination sustainable? 
5. What can we expect to happen in terms of the political economy of 
migration within China and how will this affect the West? 
 
We realise each of these questions is worthy of a library of its own. Throughout, we 
will therefore be explicit as to the limited information we base our preliminary 
answers on. 
 
General Economic Background: Chinese GDP Growth Now 
and in the Future. 
 
The following three graphs show the bare bones of the Chinese economic miracle. 
 
 Figure 1: Real GDP growth in China 1981-2009 (source: China Yearbook) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
%
 Re
al
 Ch
an
ge
 pe
r a
nn
um
 
Years
China's Real GDP Growth  
 
 Figure 2: Nominal Chinese exports 1982-2009 (source: China Yearbook) 
 
 
 Figure 3: Aggregate composition of the Chinese economy 1981-2009  
  (source: China Yearbook) 
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These three figures show that the Chinese economic miracle has been a classic export-
lead story closely mimicking the experience of the Asian tigers in the 60s to 80s. 
Exports have risen faster than its level of GDP, with the total level of exports 
overtaking that of Germany in the mid 2000s such that China’s export is now only 
second to that of the US.  
In terms of GDP, when China relaxed the central control system in 1978, its nominal 
GDP was roughly comparable to that of Costa Rica, standing at around 200 US 
(1990) dollars per person per year. Currently, the best PPP estimates available put 
Chinese GDP at roughly 5000 US dollars per person per year, having increased 
roughly 10% each year in the whole 30 year period. Nominal GDP is four times 
smaller, but this is mainly due to low prices for non-tradable goods (housing in 
particular) and an active policy of buying up US government debt in order to keep the 
exchange rate artificially low. Hence, China is already the second largest economy in 
the world.  
The sectoral composition of the Chinese economy, as shown in Figure 3, is far more 
industry-intensive than the economy of any OECD country, which typically 
constitutes about 70% services and 25% industry. This underscores the fact that the 
Chinese economic miracle has occurred via export-lead manufacturing. If China 
follows the pattern typical of the Asian tigers (including Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), it will soon start to expand its service industry 
to eventually dwarf its now dominant manufacturing sector. 
Figure 4 below shows the relative size of various regions of the world in terms of PPP 
dollars, past, current, and future. The Appendix details how these figures were arrived 
at, but we can here mention the key aspects: we took the Maddison tables on PPP-
adjusted growth for all regions up to 2004, extrapolating the economies for further 
years using the estimated UN-World Book reported growth rates. We grouped 
countries together into blocks in order to prevent the well-known phenomenon of 
having small countries with high recent growth rates expected to grow beyond 
reasonable bounds. We then extrapolated ahead using a very simple rule of thumb for 
developing countries, based on the experience of the Asian tigers. In particular, we 
presumed growth rates to stay stable for the US and other developed regions, with the 
growth rates of China and India also held stable until they hit about 66% of the per-
person GDP of the US, after which they are presumed to follow the world growth 
rate. The 66% figure is the average level of GDP at which Japan, Korea, Singapore, 
and other Asian countries stopped outgrowing the US and there was no marked period 
of slower or faster growth between the moment they clearly started developing 
(defined as 5 consecutive years of outgrowing the US) and the period they stopped 
developing (less that 4 years out of 5 in which they outgrew the US). As to population 
growth rates, we simply adopt the extrapolations published by the UN. We realise that 
to take historical patterns as an indication of the future is somewhat arbitrary, but will 
mention that one can easily rationalise this with a macro-model of country-specific 
institutional limits to growth rates. 
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Figure 4: Relative size of the major economies in the world (source: Frijters et 
al. 2008). 
 
The main interesting aspect of the figures above is that ‘The West’ produced about 
60% of the world economy in 1950, close to 75% if we would include the regions of 
Eastern Europe and the former USSR (EE/fUSSR) into our definition of ‘the West’. 
China accounted for less than 5% of world GDP then, even though it accounted for 
more than a quarter of the world population. By 2004, China already accounted for 
close to 12% of the World economy, projecting to account for close to 35% of the 
world economy by 2040, which is a little over the size of the whole of the ‘extended 
West’ combined. Interestingly enough, by 2040 India will be the other main economic 
powerhouse, accounting for an additional 15% of the World economy and projected 
to eventually overtake China. As India’s  population grows faster than that of China  it 
will catch up, even if its growth spurt is less spectacular than that of China. With these 
growth rates, China is expected to overtake the US as the biggest single economy 
around the year 2019. 
 
We can make a couple of remarks here as to whether there are any obvious signs that 
the Chinese economy will run out of steam in the coming decades, i.e. anything that 
would make it likely that it will not reach the 66% per-person GDP of the US. Reflect 
on the following figures in this regard: 
- According to the China Yearbook, average saving rates in China are close to 
35%, which are exceptionally high for any country and time period. 
- Education levels are soaring, with the current generation having at least 3 
years on average more education than the generation of 25 years ago (see 
further sections for direct evidence).  
- Very ambitious long-term investments, including an ambitious program of 
setting up more universities, covering the whole country with highways and 
modern communication technologies. 
- Rapid modernisation of the central and city bureaucracies itself, witnessed by 
the introduction of new regulators, the gradual opening of China’s capital 
market, and the enormous expansion in city-based higher education (Tobin, 
2005). 
- A boom in agricultural production and an increase in food prices (Meng et al. 
2005). 
In short, each of the production factors one usually thinks of (human capital, 
technology, government, physical capital, resources) is accumulating with no major 
impediment to sustained growth in sight. If China were to follow the examples of 
Korea and Japan, then the somewhat vulnerable reliance on foreign exports as a 
source of growth should also start to diminish soon as Chinese industries start to cater 
for Chinese consumers. 
At face value therefore, there is no major impediment to report on the macro-
economic side that would prevent China from rapidly overtaking the West as the 
largest economy in the world. This of course will have geo-political implications on 
many fronts. The dominant economy in the world will undoubtedly be dragged into 
local regional conflicts in other parts of the world if these conflicts threaten its supply 
of raw materials or access to consumer markets. Though internally more 
homogeneous than any other major country (some 92% of the Chinese population is 
part of the Han-Chinese ethnic group, all using the same script and speaking very 
similar languages), China does have its own share of ethnic and religious minorities 
who can potentially drag it into various conflicts with its neighbours or with world 
religions.  
Here, we can briefly  mention a few other salient aspects of the Chinese growth 
experience: 
1. Though dominated by export-industries located in the major cities, there has 
also been spectacular growth across the more rural provinces of China (Unel 
and Zebregs 2006), partially fuelled by the development of inland cities like 
Chongquing or Luoyang. When the Chinese economy becomes more 
inwardly-oriented via an expanded service sector there is no good reason to 
expect this trend to be unsustainable in the medium-run. This will also open up 
new opportunities for rural workers to migrate to. 
2. Following a whole set of reforms in the 90s the urban welfare state has 
effectively been dismantled, except for free education. Unemployment, old 
age, and health are no longer insured by the state and are now only insured via 
employers or within extended families. This  partially explains  the extremely 
high rates of savings (Meng, 2007). 
3. The Chinese Communist party has changed from being a vehicle for 
communist ideology to  an accommodator of economic networks. 
Entrepreneurs were welcomed into the party in large droves  in the mid 2000s; 
membership has grown to about 6-7% of the population; and embryonic 
democratisation has occurred within the party. This has arguably removed 
political impediments to economic growth. 
 
  
General Migration Background. 
 
In the figure below, we show the estimates of the World Bank regarding the number 
of rural migrants in China. They were generated by asking individuals in rural villages 
how many members of their village were now in the cities. 
 
 Figure 5: Total rural to urban migration 1997-2005 (source: World Bank) 
 
The most glaring aspect of this figure is the sheer magnitude of the difference 
between the level of migration at the start in 1997 and 8 years later. The level of 
migration more than tripled during the period, showing that before the late 1990s the 
cities effectively grew without many rural migrants. However, since the late 1990s it 
can be seen that they started absorbing migrants on a grand scale. If we were to 
simply take a low estimate of the linear projection of these trends (say, 10 million net 
additional migrants per year), then there would have to be around 165 million 
migrants in 2009. Put otherwise, urbanisation increased 10% in about 12 years solely 
due to rural to urban migration (hence neglecting the transformation of villages into 
cities). 
Compare this level of exceedingly rapid urbanisation with the closest historical 
analogy we can think of, the industrial revolution in Europe, where GDP growth rates 
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were on average 2% with short periods of higher growth during the period 1800-1950. 
The picture below, which uses data from De Vries (1984), Grauman (1977), and the 
UN (with a threshold level of population density as a rough definition of an urban 
community) shows the speed of urbanisation in Europe. 
 
Figure 6: Urbanisation in Europe 1500-2025 (source data: Jan de Vries 1984; 
John Grauman 1977; UN calculations  (after 1950)) 
 
This picture highlights that before the industrial revolution, which roughly started 
around 1800, Europe was still 90% rural. At its fastest, in the period 1900-1950, it 
took Europe 40 years to increase from 30% urbanised to 50% urbanised. Compared to 
this figure, it is clear that China is currently urbanising at least twice as fast. 
We may also  mention here that the period of urbanisation in Europe was one of 
emerging ideologies. It was the time when nationalism became firmly established and 
a period that witnessed the advent of the temperance movement, the puritans and 
extreme forms of Protestantism, etc. We cannot claim that these developments were 
causally linked, but it is an interesting hypothesis to think that the extremist ideology 
had something to do with the large population of rural migrants who felt alienated in 
the big cities and who found a home in the emerging ideologies of the day. This 
overview paper is not the place to argue this in greater detail, but from an overall 
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perspective the link between mass-migration to mass-ideology via mass-loneliness is 
perhaps the most important in terms of the possible dangers  migration poses to 
stability. 
Even without a possible dangerous cultural change component to migration, there are 
immediate reasons to believe that mass migration will seriously change the internal 
dynamics of China. The main reason is that the countryside is emptying of young 
people, consequently undermining the traditionally important role of the elderly 
within village life. The land ownership of the elderly is now less important than the 
income-generating role of the young workers in the cities, thus reversing the 
traditional balance of power within families (see Chang, 2008, for an insightful 
account of the changing social relations in the city and in the countryside due to 
migration). 
 
  
The Rumici Project: Who are the Migrants? 
 
The Rural Urban Migration In China and Indonesia (Rumici) Project is a panel data 
study into migration. The Chinese part of the project consists of tracking about 5000 
migrants and their families for 4 years, starting in 2008. As comparison information, 
the Rumici Project also tracks 5000 urban households and 10000 rural households in 
the same period, asking the same questions. 
The questionnaire administered to these samples is found at rumici.anu.edu.au and 
includes the usual questions of a panel dataset, i.e. information on jobs, incomes, 
health, education, and social relations. The main difficulty in the case of China was to 
find the migrants, for they are not officially registered anywhere, implying that a 
mini-census had to be undertaken in each of the 15 cities in order to find 
representative samples. More information can be found in the book produced on the 
first wave by Meng et al. (2009, eds). 
The key definitions are that rural migrants report to have non-urban hukou and are 
nevertheless working and living in the cities; urban individuals have urban hukou; and 
rural non-migrants are member of households that do not include migrants and that 
have non-urban hukoui (on the importance of hukou see Meng et al. 2009). 
The following three figures reveal information about the age, education, and income 
of the migrant households in the first wave (2007-2008). 
 
Figure 7: The age distribution of migrants, rural non-migrants, and urban 
individuals. 
  
Figure 8: Average education by age for migrants, rural non-migrants, and 
urban individuals. 
 
 
Figure 9: Average per capita income for migrant, rural non-migrant, and urban 
households. 
 
Figure 7 reveals that the migrants are disproportionately young compared to urban 
individuals or rural non-migrants. This is of course closely related to the fact that a 
large proportion of the migrants have only relatively recently arrived in the cities (see 
Figure 5). One can also see that young children older than 4 are disproportionately 
missing from the migrant sample, which is because in most cities migrant children are 
not allowed to go to school if they do not have urban hukou.  Hence the children of 
migrants often remain in the countryside looked after by family members. 
Figure 8 shows average education by age for the three samples and shows many 
interesting trends. From a macro-perspective, the most important fact is perhaps that 
the total number of years of schooling has increased tremendously for all three 
groups, with the youngest cohorts having at least 3 more years of education than their 
grandparents. It also shows that the elderly belonging to the migrant households are 
the relatively higher educated elderly amongst the countryside, implying that it is the 
children of the relatively well-educated who have been first to take advantage of the 
opportunity to migrate. Another salient feature is that there is not a substantial 
difference in terms of education between those who leave for the cities and those who 
stay behind in the countryside. This indicates that the majority of the gain in 
education is universal. Finally, Figure 8 shows the large gap between the countryside 
and the city in terms of levels of education, which  is partially because university 
education is almost solely a city-phenomenon. Indeed, there is cream-skimming of 
migrants in that those migrants who pass the university entrance exams are offered 
urban hukou, implyingthat they are no longer defined as migrants (we unfortunately 
have no statistics on how many of these there are, but it is likely that there are few 
because the expansion in tertiary education was only recent and focussed on the 
cities). 
We can  briefly mention some other salient characteristics of the migrants. Less than 
3% are from an ethnic group, even though 8% of the whole Chinese population is 
from an ethnic group ( even though the urban population itself has about double the 
concentration of ethnicities compared to the migrants), implying that the economic 
advantages in our 15 cities are mainly taken up by Han-Chinese. In addition, the 
average number of working hours of the migrants is about 58, compared to 43 hours 
for urban workers, indicating that the migrants work exceptionally hard. 
  
 Policy Relevant Aspects of the Migration Experience 
The children of migrants: are they better or worse off ? 
One important policy question is whether the migration of a large part of the prime-
age population of China adversely  affects the children of migrants. If so, this would 
create costs in the future in terms of reduced education, health, etc. Conversely, one 
might expect them to do better because of the additional income generated by the 
migration of their parents. 
The next figure summarise the more extensive information on this issue generated by 
Kong and Meng (2009). 
 
 Figure 10: Physical height of the children of migrants compared to children of 
urban hukou holders. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates that there is a difference in height between urban children and the 
children of migrants, but that the difference is quite small. This small difference is 
also evidenced by the absence of a negative difference in the degree of health 
problems experienced by children as reported by their parents (see Kong and Meng 
2009). This is despite the fact that the amount of health spending is far greater for 
urban children. One possible reason for this  apparent contradiction is that the 
countryside is in fact healthier in terms of pollution levels and opportunities for 
exercise than the urban environment. 
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Kong and Meng (2009) similarly depict trends in education. The children of migrants 
are not more likely to drop out of school or have problems at school, as reported by  
their parents. Indeed, the self-reported performance of school children is slightly 
higher amongst migrants, but this may be partially due to ignorance on the part of 
migrants as to how their children are doing or the greater level of ambition on the part 
of urban parents. 
The bottom line of these observations is quite straightforward though: at present there 
is no indication that the children of migrants are seriously worse-off than the children 
of non-migrating households, and that there is little difference in terms of health 
status. What is still true is that the children of migrants, like other children connected 
to rural hukou, can be expected to end up with much less education than urban 
children. This is a difference that is yet to be addressed by policy makers. 
 
 Family Formation and Migration 
The question emerges whether the current pattern of migration is ‘costing’ China a lot 
of unborn children. Moving to the city and working exceptionally long working hours 
can be expected to crowd out other activities in the 20-35 age bracket and one other 
important activity is family formation. Hence, the next figure gives information on the 
relationship between migration and family formation (see Ning et al. 2009).   
  
 
Figure 11: The percentage of  women with at least 1 child by age 
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 Figure 11 shows that there is quite a significant degree of delay in child-bearing age 
for migrants compared to  their non-migrating rural counterparts or the urban hukou 
holders. Whilst the recent glut in migration has occurred it is still too soon to say for 
certain that lifetime fertility is going to be affected for migrants. Nevertheless, it is a 
near certainty that it observed decreases in fertility will exist because the ability to 
conceive itself goes down as womenage and we can thus be certain that there will be 
more childless migrants in the future due to the delay in childbearing. If these trends 
continue and it becomes a general pattern that the majority of the prime age workers 
from the countryside work in the cities and delay their childbearing, then Chinese 
overall fertility is certain to drop substantially in the coming decades. 
 Migration and Discrimination 
Equity amongst migrants and urban households is perhaps the most immediate and 
pressing policy issue. Unlike the migration in Europe during the industrial revolution, 
the Chinese migrants already self-identify in a similar way to the urban households: 
their script is the same and the differences in dialects are relatively small. Also, as 
mentioned above, they self-identify as Han-Chinese and receive exactly the same 
education in school regarding their ancestry. This means that any strong and open 
degree of discrimination between rural migrants and urban households has the 
potential to raise enormous levels of political unrest should the migrants start to feel 
they are unfairly treated. 
The key information on differences in hourly total compensation across the 15 cities 
is given in the figure below, where the data comes from Frijters et al. (2009): 
 
 Figure 12: Median hourly compensation for urban workers and migrant 
workers in the 15 Chinese cities of the Rumici project. 
 
Figure 12 shows the raw difference in median hourly compensation for workers 
across cities, where hourly compensation includes wage earnings, employer-provided 
welfare payments (primarily unemployment, health, and pension insurance 
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contributions), and in-kind food and housing support. These hourly differences do not 
take account of the fact that urban workers are more highly educated, nor the fact that 
the migrants are of prime-age compared to the urban workers who are often past their 
optimal age. Nevertheless, the wage differences are striking. For one, the wage 
differences between cities are simply staggering: the median urban person in 
Shanghai earns about 3 times more than the median urban person in Bangbu. Such a 
large difference is probably only maintained due to the difficulty of moving across 
cities even for urban hukou holders (hukou is specific to a place). 
The difference in hourly compensation between urban workers and migrant workers is 
also striking, with the migrant workers earning no more than about 37% of an urban 
worker’s hourly rate .  
Before we present wage-differences corrected for the human capital variables we 
observe, we first want to address the question of whether there is actual evidence of 
discrimination and what channels the discrimination would go via: 
- Are the migrants legally discriminated? Indeed they are. They do not have 
urban hukou and hence their children are usually not allowed to go to school 
in the cities. Furthermore, each city has its own regulations regarding the jobs 
that migrants are allowed to do, with most cities reserving government jobs for 
urban hukou holders (see Frijters et al. 2009). Worse, in many cities, migrants 
are not allowed to have managerial positions, which implies that their options 
within the competitive sector are also limited to the lower-paying jobs. In 
some cities, there is even an explicit guest-worker system with migrants 
staying in specialised accommodation. 
- Do the migrants have equal access to credit? On the whole, no; because they 
have no clear legal status they basically cannot access urban credit markets. 
Their high degree of mobility and inability to use any land back home as 
collateral prevents them from credibly taking out loans at banks. As a result, 
Frijters, Liu, and Meng (2008) found that about half of the migrants who want 
to be self-employed are self-employed. Preliminary information on the second 
wave shows that those who are not self-employed indeed self-report to have 
difficulty gaining access to credit. What credit there is, is informal, i.e. 
migrants borrow from  family and friends or self-finance via savings. 
Interestingly, self-employed migrants earn about 40% more than non-self-
employed migrants and migrants who are self-employed estimate they would 
earn about 40% less if they were not  self-employed! Also, some 25% of 
migrants are self-employed compared to only about 5% of the urban 
population. All these ‘strange’ facts make sense if one sees self-employment 
as an attempt to circumvent the legal restrictions migrants face with regards to 
having high-paying jobs. Starting ones own business is then a means of 
realising ones actual potential, something the urban workers have no need for 
because they are not discriminated against within the cities. 
 
We would thus want to argue that there is indeed direct evidence of market 
imperfections when it comes to the labour market migrants live in. They face legal 
discrimination in the cities regarding the entitlements of their children, and they face a 
missing credit market due to their higher mobility, uncertain legal status, and inability 
to use any assets they own in the countryside as collateral. These ‘restrictions’ benefit 
urban insiders who can thus be expected to capture the administration of their cities in 
order to protect the rents these restrictions bring them. 
 
 Are the migrants unhappier due to their discrimination? 
Figure 13 illustrates the distribution of happiness across migrants, urban individuals, 
and non-migrating rural individuals. 
 
Figure 13: Happiness amongst migrants, urban individuals, and non-migrating 
rural individuals. 
 
Findings show some happiness differences between the three groups do exist. 
Migrants are a little unhappier than the urban individuals and  the rural individuals are 
the happiest. Though each of these differences is  certainly statistically significant 
given the large numbers of individuals involved, they are not really economically 
significant. Compared to the differences in happiness seen across countries (see Clark 
et al. 2008), these differences are not larger than those between closely related OECD 
countries, such as France and England. Hence, the overt discrimination faced by the 
migrants, the differential treatment of their children, the fact that many cannot access 
the credit that would allow them to escape their wage-paying jobs in favour of self-
employment, and the differential pattern of lifetime fertility that their situation has 
lead to, has not translated into a clear degree of resentment with their own life. 
Despite using a non-representative sample of migrants that probably oversamples the 
more successful migrants, Frijters, Liu and Meng (2008), find that a large part of the 
migrants’happiness is attributable to the high levels of expectations they have 
regarding their incomes. This suggests that the lack of open dissatisfaction is gained 
through the high sustained levels of economic growth. 
The figure also shows that the happiest group is in fact made up of the rural residents 
who do not have migrated family members. This is remarkable because they are also 
the poorest group, with the gap in wealth and wages relative to urban individuals 
increasing over time (Meng et al. 2005; Meng 2007). 
 
 Market forces undermining the discrimination 
The central government in recent years has undertaken various legal initiatives to 
address the legal entitlements of migrants, which we will only briefly mention. 
Amongst these are compulsory insurance schemes for all workers, an embryonic 
migrant registration system, and legislation outlawing particular forms of legal 
discrimination within cities. We do not yet know whether these regulations will be 
enforced and how widely they are actually intended to be implemented. 
One may wonder if there are market forces that could break the discrimination of 
migrants even in the absence of government regulation. After all, restricting migrants 
from attaining their potential leads to market opportunities for those able to find a way 
to circumvent the restrictions. Some possibilities we can only speculate about, such as 
the possibility of attaining urban hukou through marriage. There is one possibility we 
can directly provide information on, which is the possibility of individual cities to 
undermine the rent-seeking opportunities of the insiders of other cities.  
If one city does not share the same restrictions, what can be expected to happen? In 
most cases, over time prospective migrants will learn that they face better 
opportunities at the ‘fair’ city, implying that that city would enjoy an influx of highly 
able migrants from which their employers could choose. Given that we are still 
talking of a situation in which cities grow so fast that employers only need to pay 
marginal productivity and thus can enjoy the difference between the average 
productivity of the migrants and their marginal productivity (i.e. credit markets 
haven’t caught up to the extent that no profits are being made), it should be clear that 
the deviating city may well enjoy high rents from undercutting the restrictions 
imposed by other cities. This is of course a particular example of the Tiebout theorem 
at work (Tiebout 1956), where cities in competitive equilibrium are forced to offer the 
amenities that attract enough residents because its residents will otherwise migrate 
elsewhere.  
Is there any evidence for the Tiebout theorem at work? Consider the evidence of the 
percentage of workers whose employers indeed pay the ‘compulsory’ workers 
insurance by city: 
 
 
 Figure 14a: Percentage of migrant and urban workers with pension coverage. 
 
Figure 14b: Percentage of migrant and urban workers with unemployment 
insurance coverage. 
 
Figures 14a and 14b show that Wuxi, a medium-wage level city, has indeed started to 
offer similar legal packages to migrant workers in that the difference between 
insurance coverage is small in that city. For the other cities, the difference in 
insurance coverage is often enormous. In Shanghai for instance, almost no migrants 
are covered by the ‘compulsory’ insurance, whilst nearly all urban workers are 
covered. In yet other cities, like Dongguan, insurance coverage of migrants is about 
half that of rural individuals. 
We now show the percentage of the wage differences in Figure 12 that are not 
explained by observable characteristics (taken from Frijters et al. 2009, using standard 
Oaxaca wage decompositions), where the observed characteristics include age, tenure, 
schooling, health, sector, gender, firm-size, marital status, and height: 
 
 
Figure 15: Percentage of the raw median wage difference not explained by 
characteristics. 
 
The unexplained difference is calculated by predicting the wage of the median urban 
individual in each city if  they were  paid according to the wage schedule of the 
migrants and then calculating how much of the difference between the median urban 
and the median migrant worker in that city was not explained by it.  
The most striking aspect with respect to Figure 15 is that the percentage unexplained 
is actually negative for Wuxi, which we interpret to mean that a migrant there has a 
higher unobserved quality component than the urban worker. This is in direct 
agreement with the prediction from the Tiebout model that offering a fair legal system 
would entice the better migrants to go to that city.  
Figure 15 also shows that in most cities, the observed characteristics explain very 
little. In Shanghai for instance, nearly 80% of the wage difference is not explained by 
the observable characteristics, concurring with the fact that the percentage of migrants 
receiving their ‘compulsory’ employer contributions is almost 0% in Shanghai.  
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In this paper we have attempted to argue that, according to the limited evidence we 
have available, the largest human peacetime migration ever is so far happening 
without significant obstacles. In particular, we have argued that: 
- The migrants are not much unhappier than their rural or urban counterparts, 
even though they work very long hours (58 per week compared to urban 
workers’ 43) and are usually not allowed to stay permanently. 
-  Their children are not experiencing too many problems in that their levels of 
health as reported by their parents are not worse than those of urban children, 
and that the levels of reported problems at school are slightly less than that 
reported for urban children. 
- The fertility is affected in that migrants significantly delay their time till first 
child, but it is an open question whether the decreased lifetime fertility that 
this is likely to lead to is a good or a bad thing. 
 
In terms of the economic forces we found to be at work on the labour market we can 
say that: 
- The migrants are legally discriminated against within cities, in that the jobs 
they can do are restricted, and they usually do not get the welfare insurance 
they are entitled to (pensions, health, unemployment). As a result, their 
median hourly compensation is on average only 37% of that of urban workers, 
of which only a small part is explained by observed characteristics like 
education and tenure. 
- The Tiebout theorem is at work in  that a city has been identified (Wuxi) 
which seems to be able to attract the better migrants by offering a fairer legal 
system. If other cities follow suite, then the legal discrimination would be 
overcome by market forces in the absence of central government intervention. 
 
What can we further expect to happen? Here, we enter the realm more of speculation, 
but we would expect to see the same issues emerge in Chinese capitalist cities as is 
evident in Western capitalist cities and in other cities in Asia (such as Singapore). In 
particular, if the government will not provide welfare insurance and include migrants 
in joint city identity, then we expect religious groups and gangs to enter the market for 
these psychic needs. Iannaconne and Berman (2006) have an explicit model of 
religion that argues this basic mechanism, even though they were more concerned 
with explaining Muslim fundamentalism than future cultural changes in China.  
 
Finally, will any of the issues signalled above affect the West in any material way? It 
seems very unlikely, simply because the level of internal unhappiness is quite low at 
the moment and none of the indicators of future growth (education, health, 
investment, savings, etc.) suggests the Chinese growth miracle has run its course. 
Frijters, Liu, and Meng (2008) argue that the low level of unrest stems from the high 
level of realistically optimistic expectations fed by the high level of actual growth, 
again implying one should not expect much internal unrest in the near future as long 
as growth persists.  
Perhaps there is one mechanism which will directly affect the West, which is that a 
great many Chinese will be able to afford to travel outside of China as tourists or 
migrants. This would by and large seem to herald a positive externality for the ‘West’, 
i.e. it would constitute a form of brain drain.  
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